Following the U.S. attack on Iran’s primary nuclear facilities at Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan, Tehran faces nothing but bad options. Militarily, Iran can escalate the conflict by attacking U.S. forces and allies in the region, as it did on Monday with missile attacks on U.S. bases in Qatar and Iraq. Iran could also close the Strait of Hormuz, withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty or even attempt a rapid “breakout” run to a bomb with its residual capabilities. Each of these options virtually assures an American military response that goes far beyond Iran’s nuclear program, possibly leading to a targeted campaign to topple the regime, the Islamic Republic’s greatest nightmare.
A more likely military response would therefore be for Iran to respond by continuing to attack Israel — as it did just hours after the U.S. strike — in an attempt to turn the conflict into a war of attrition that Israel can ill afford. Israel could escalate to try to end the war more swiftly and avoid prolonging losses.
Diplomatically, Iran can return to negotiations but rebuff President Trump’s demand for an “unconditional surrender,” whose terms he had not spelled out. In reality, these would likely include the complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and significant curbs to its regional role, along with long-term inspections and more. Should Tehran rebuff these demands, it would greatly increase the risk of further American military action, including against the regime itself — targeting military and civilian leaders and infrastructure, not just nuclear sites.
Alternatively, it can essentially accede to Trump’s demands, in which case it avoids direct American intervention and the war ends, but Iran loses its ultimate security guarantor — the nuclear capability — and virtually all of its leverage to seek any concessions in further international talks. The regime would also appear so weak that the probability of a domestic uprising would increase exponentially.
Whichever option Iran chooses, the very future of the Islamic Republic has never been in greater peril. Accordingly, the prospects for a dramatic positive transformation of the Middle Eastern strategic landscape have never been greater.
The decades-long American effort to establish a regional coalition of Arab states and Israel, to contain Iran, will be given a significant boost, as the former gains confidence to do so in the face of a greatly weakened Iran and resurgent U.S. in the region. The dangers of proliferation, at least in the Middle East, might be greatly reduced. Israel will have demonstrated — albeit this time only with critical American assistance — that the “Begin doctrine” (Israeli determination to take all means necessary to prevent a hostile regional state from developing nuclear weapons) still applies. Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the three most likely proliferators in the region after Iran, will have little reason to pursue nuclear weapons.
Russia’s and China’s inability to provide their Iranian ally with any practical backing during the war stands in stark contrast to the U.S. and Israel and is particularly galling for Iran because of its strong support for the Kremlin during Russia’s war in Ukraine. Moscow and Beijing will suffer a significant reduction in their regional standing, accruing to Washington’s benefit. The Middle East will once again be considered a clearly American-dominated region, in which Russia and China will have to tread more carefully.
There are some in the U.S. who fear Mideast conflicts distract American attention from the competition with China — the only nation approaching the economic influence of the U.S. today — and Russia. But taking a direct role in this Iran-Israel conflict has not diverted American focus from Moscow and Beijing. On the contrary, it has significantly strengthened Washington’s global stature compared with both countries. China will be more hesitant to attack Taiwan now that the U.S. has demonstrated willingness to bomb aggressors against American allies.
An Israel whose enemies have been dramatically weakened, and which no longer faces an existential threat from Iran, would be in a far better position to make progress on the Palestinian issue, beginning with an end to the war in Gaza. Indeed, it would not be far-fetched to assume that Trump, always transactional, may have made this a precondition for his support for Israel in the war. Saudi-Israeli normalization will be back on the table.
Netanyahu has prepared for this moment for 30 years, for the opportunity to put an end to the only existential threat Israel continues to face. From the reviled leader whose administration allowed the Oct. 7 fiasco and various outrages in domestic affairs, he now stands to be remembered as one of Israel’s great heroes. Moreover, a favorable outcome to the war may very well save him from what otherwise appears to have been a looming electoral defeat — which could have been followed by jail time, given the corruption charges he faces.
The bigger question is whether Netanyahu — whose deep understanding of Israel’s overall strategic circumstances no one has ever doubted — will wish to use this opportunity to crown his legacy not just with saving Israel from an existential military threat, but also from an almost equally severe demographic challenge to its own future as a Jewish and democratic state. Fordo may be gone; the Palestinians remain. He would truly cement his standing in history if he ended the Gaza war and paved the way to a resolution of the Palestinian issue.
Both Netanyahu and Trump deserve credit for taking daring action, and they must be prepared to continue doing so. This is not the time to be fainthearted but to continue pressing the advantage. They have engaged in a classic case of coercive diplomacy, the use of military force for diplomatic ends, and must see it through to the desired end: a diplomatic agreement with Iran that ensures, with an inspections regime of unprecedented intrusiveness, that it can never again develop nuclear capabilities for military purposes, puts severe limits on its missile capabilities and curtails its malign regional role.
Even with a tentative cease-fire now in place, achieving an agreement of this sort will not be easy. The Iranians are unlikely to fully accede to American demands unless they truly feel that they have their backs to the wall, and even then, they are unusually effective negotiators. Persistence, focus and attention for detail, not known to be Trump’s forte, will now be called for. A historic opening has been made; it must not be squandered.
Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli deputy national security advisor, is a senior fellow at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies. Colin. P. Clarke is the director of research at the Soufan Group, a security and intelligence consulting firm based in New York City.
